






How Constructive Engagement in 
Doing Philosophy Comparatively Is Possible
Abstract
In this article I intend, on the basis of some previous relevant works on the issue, to further 
examine a range of conditions for maintaining adequate methodological guiding principles 
concerning how to look at the relation between distinct methodological perspectives in 
comparative-engagement exploration in philosophy. The purpose of this paper is to explore 
how, in the global context, distinct approaches in philosophy can be engaged in order to 













My	 strategy	 is	 the	 following:	 First,	 as	 preliminaries,	 I	 briefly	 characterize	
1
See	Bo	Mou,	 “An	Analysis	of	 the	Structure	
of	 Philosophical	 Methodology:	 In	 View	 of	
Comparative	Philosophy”,	in:	Bo	Mou	(ed.),	
Two Roads to Wisdom? Chinese and Analytic 
Philosophical Traditions,	 Open	 Court,	 Chi-
cago	2001,	pp.	337–364;	Bo	Mou,	“On	Con-
structive-Engagement	 Strategy	 of	 Compara-
tive	 Philosophy”,	 Comparative Philosophy	
1:1	 (2010),	 pp.	 1–32,	 http://www.compara-
tivephilosophy.org;	 Bo	 Mou,	 “Constructive	
Engagement	 of	 Analytic	 and	 Continental	
Approaches	 Beyond	 the	Western	 Tradition”	
[Introduction	 to	Part	Two],	 in:	Bo	Mou,	Ri-
chard	 Tieszen	 (eds.),	 Constructive Engage-
ment of Analytic and Continental Approaches 
in Philosophy: From the Vantage Point of 
Comparative Philosophy,	Brill,	Leiden	2013,	
pp.	 147–162,	 doi:	 https://doi.org/10.1163/9
789004248861;	Bo	Mou,	 “On	Constructive-
Engagement	 Strategy	 in	 Studies	 of	 Chinese	
Philosophy”,	 in:	 Sor-hoon	 Tan	 (ed.),	 The 
Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Chinese 
Philosophy	 Methodologies,	 Bloomsbury	
Academic,	 London	 –	 New	 York	 2016,	 pp.	
199–226,	 doi:	 https://doi.org/10.5040/97814
74295024.ch-010.	 This	 article	 is	 not	 to	 just	
repeat	 or	 reformulate	what	 has	been	written	
before	but	 contains	 some	new	contents,	 i.e.,	








duce	 some	 preliminary	 conceptual	 and	 explanatory	 resources	 and	 relevant	
distinctions	needed.	Second,	I	further	examine	a	range	of	ten	related	adequacy	












in	 doing	 philosophy	 comparatively,	 generally	 but	 briefly	 speaking,	 can	 be	
presented	in	the	following	summarized	way:	It	is	to	inquire	into	how,	by	way	
of	 reflective	criticism	 (including	 self-criticism)	and	argumentation,	distinct	
approaches	 from	 different	 philosophical	 traditions	 (whether	 distinguished	
culturally	or	by	styles	and	orientations)	can	learn	from	each	other	and	jointly	
contribute	to	the	contemporary	development	of	philosophy	on	a	range	of	phil-
osophical	 issues	or	 topics,	which	can	be	 jointly	concerned	and	approached	
through	 appropriate	 philosophical	 interpretation	 and	 from	 a	 broader	 philo-
sophical	vantage	point.	The	constructive-engagement	strategy	in	doing	phi-
losophy	comparatively	can	be	effectively	implemented	in	studies	of	any	cul-
ture-associated	 philosophical	 traditions	 (such	 as	 the	Chinese	 philosophical	



















to the contemporary development of philosophy	on	a	range	of	philosophical	







One	central	concern	 in	 the	constructive-engagement	strategy	 is	how	 to	ad-
equately	look	at	the	relationship	between	distinct	approaches	from	different	
philosophical	 traditions	 (identities	 of	 philosophical	 traditions	 understood	
























































ciple:	 in	 looking	at	 the	 relation	between	 the	agent’s	current	perspective	
in	 treating	an	object	of	 study	and	other	eligible	perspectives	 (if	 any),	 a	
methodological	guiding	principle	is	considered	adequate	(in	regard	to	rec-
ognizing	perspective	eligibility)	when	it	allows	in	other	eligible	perspec-
tives	 to	complement	 the	application	of	 the	current	perspective	and	 thus	
has	the	agent	realize	that	these	eligible	perspectives	do	separately	capture	






principles	 that	 the	 agent	might	 presuppose	 in	 her	 actual	 application	 of	 the	





















































to	 hold	 in	 evaluating	 the	 status	 and	 nature	 of	 the	 eligible	methodological	
perspectives,	applying	her	own	methodological	perspective,	and	looking	at	
the	 relationship	 between	 her	 current	working	 perspective	 and	 other	meth-



























pursuit	 norm	 in	 philosophy’),	 there	 is	much	

















tive	 examination	 of	 Socrates’	 and	 Confucius’	 distinct	 approaches	 to	
how	to	understand	‘(filial)	piety’,	the	addressed	general	‘same-object’	
issue	shows	up	here	as	follows:	“Were	both	thinkers	talking	about	the	

















spectives	 (if	 any)	 also	 eligible	 and	 somehow	 compatible	with	 the	 ap-








the	 Confucius-style	 becoming-aspect-concerned	 perspective.	 The	 two	
kinds	of	methodological	perspectives	point	respectively	to	the	two	most	
basic	modes	of	existence	(being	and	becoming)	of	things	in	the	world	that	





































methodological	 perspectives,	 although	 one	 eligible	 perspective	 can	 be
rendered	more	 (or	even	 the	most)	 suitable	 than	others	only	 relative	 to
its	 associated	 purpose	 and	 the	 aspect	 of	 the	 object	 to	which	 it	 points;
4
Socrates’s	 distinctive	 methodological	 ap-
proach	 which	 he	 consciously	 and	 system-
atically	 pursues	 in	 some	 earlier	 Platonic	
dialogues	 is	 called	elenkhos	in	 Greek,	 more	
usually	 written	elenchus,	 literally	 meaning	
‘refutation’.	 The	elenchus	approach	 can	 be	
seen	 most	 clearly	 in	 such	 short	 dialogues	
as	Laches	(to	 define	 bravery)	 and	 Euthyph-
ro	(to	define	piety),	but	it	is	also	used	in	Book	
I	of	the	Republic,	the	first	part	of	Meno,	Pro-
tagoras,	 and	Gorgias.	 The	 presentation	 of	
such	a	methodological	approach	in	the	Euthy-
phro is	 usually	 considered	 the	 neatest,	most	
concise,	and	representative,	especially	in	con-
nection	with	its	perspective	and	instrumental	
dimensions.	 The	 manifest	 level	 or	 layer	 of	
the	elenchus	approach	 clearly	 reveals	 itself	
through	 the	 dialogue	 between	 Socrates	 and	
Euthyphro	on	 the	 latter’s	 four	definitions	of	
piety	 presented	 in	 the	Euthyphro (focusing	
on	 5a–15d,	 especially	 see	 5c–d);	 Socrates	
puts	 forward	 the	 question	 “What	 is	 piety?”	
and	sets	up	three	conditions	or	requirements	
to	be	met:	 (1)	some	 feature	 that	 is	 the	 same	
in	every	pious	action;	(2)	this	feature	will	not	
be	 shared	 by	 any	 impious	 action;	 (3)	it	will	
be	 that	 feature	(or	 the	 lack	of	 it)	 that	makes	
an	 action	 pious	 (or	 impious).	 The	elen-
chus	methodological	approach	can	be	applied	
to	 anything	 that	 deserves	 reflective	 exami-
nation.	 For	 good	 examinations	 of	 Socrates’	
elenchus	method,	see	Gregory	Vlastos,	“The	
Socratic	Elenchus”,	in:	Julia	Annas	(ed.),	Ox-
ford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,	 Vol.	 1,	








izing	 those	 things	 like	xiao	(孝	 filial	 piety)	
and	ren	(仁	 tentatively	 glossed	 as	 ‘human-
ity’)	 is	 revealed	 in	 the	Analects.	 Indeed,	 in-
terestingly	 enough,	 like	Socrates,	Confucius	
also	 had	 dialogue	 with	 his	 interlocutors	 on	











questioner	 some	 useful	 guidance.	 Although	
it	 is	 unclear	 exactly	 why	 the	 cited	 sections	
2.5–2.8	were	arranged	in	the	order	they	were,	















one’s	 evaluation	 of	 the	 status	 of	 the	 Socrates-style	 being-aspect-con-
cerned	 perspective	 (or	 the	Confucius-style	 becoming-aspect-concerned	
perspective)	and	thus	renders	it	indiscriminately	and	absolutely	superior	





























































together	with	 regard	 to	 their	 legal	 relationship.	However,	 suppose	 that	
later	on	their	relationship	turned	bad	with	serious	conflict;	the	conflict	is	
so	severe	that	the	“harmony”	aspect	of	their	legal	relationship	is	not	there	





competing	 eligible	 methodological	 perspectives	 concerning	 an	 object	
of	 study,	whose	 identity	 can	 result	 from	 dynamic	 development	 if	 any,	
turn	out	to	be	complementary	(in	the	sense	that	they	point	to	and	capture	









For	 example,	 again,	 consider	 the	 two	 sample	methodological	 perspec-






























competing	 or	 incompatible	 (either	 because	 one	 of	 them	 is	 inadequate	
or	because	both	are	 inadequate	 in	other	 connections	addressed	above),	
such	a	methodological	guiding	principle	would	be	considered	adequate	




one	 perspective	 complex	 if	 any)	while	 disregarding	what	 are	 not,	 i.e.,	
the	 inadequate	guiding	principle	 (or	principles)	 in	one	 (or	both)	of	 the	








that	 is	 associated	with	 a	guiding	principle	which	 renders	 the	perspec-
tive	 exclusively	 eligible).	 It	might	 be	 the	 case	 that	 a	 social-economic	
community	does	or	should	have	both	its	profit-seeking	layer	and	its	wel-
fare-seeking	layer	for	 the	sake	of	 its	well-being.	In	this	case,	what	re-
ally	makes	 the	 two	perspective	complexes	 competing	or	 incompatible	










librium-seeking	 condition	 (concerning	 genuinely	 competing	 perspec-
tives).	Given	 that	different	 seemingly	competing	but	eligible	methodo-









the	object,	 and	 thus	 are	 indispensable	 for	 a	 complete	understanding	of	
the	 object),	 a	methodological	 guiding	 principle	 is	 considered	 adequate	
(in	 this	connection)	 if	 it	captures	 the	genuine-contradiction	state	of	 the	
involved	aspects	of	the	object	and	seeks	for	a	certain	constructive	equi-








the	“contradiction”	aspects	of	 the	object	 is	eligible	and	contributes	 to	
our	 understanding	 and	 treatment	 of	 the	 “contradictory”	 dimension	 of	
the	object;	<3>	seeking	constructive	equilibrium	of	 the	 involved	per-
spectives.	 The	 foregoing	 sub-condition	 <3>	 is	 to	 be	 implemented	 in	
distinct	ways,	being	sensitive	to	the	nature	of	different	types	of	objects	





development	of	 the	object	 [see	 the	foregoing	adequacy	condition	(6)]	
and	change	the	original	“contradictory”	aspects	to	complementary	as-
pects	of	the	newly-developed	identity	of	the	object	[see	the	foregoing	
adequacy	condition	 (7)].	 In	contrast,	 for	an	object	of	study	as	part	of	



















dimension	 of	 an	 object)	 is	 actually	 imple-




Indeed,	 the	 truth-pursuit	 norm	 includes	 the	
reflective	pursuit	of	capturing	the	way	things	
are to be,	especially	for	some	social	issues	as	
objects	of	 study.	 I	do	not	 examine	 this	 con-
nection	of	the	philosophical	issue	of	truth	in	






JC	 Beall,	 Bradley	Armour-Garb	 (eds.),	 The 









last	but	not	 least;	 though	 the	 foregoing	conditions,	especially	 (5)	and	
(9)	 implicitly	 point	 to	 this	 condition,	 it	 is	 reflectively	worth	 specify-
ing	and	highlighting	separately,	as	this	condition	would	fundamentally	
distinguish	a	genuinely	philosophical	attitude	 towards	distinct	critical	




that	one	has	 to	stop	somewhere	 in	one’s	account	or	 theoretic	system;	
rather,	the	point	of	this	condition	is	this:	one	needs	to	always	maintain	







































Kako je moguć konstruktivni angažman u komparativnom filozofiranju
Sažetak
U ovome članku, na temelju određenih ranijih relevantnih radova o ovoj problematici, namje-
ravam dodatno istražiti niz uvjeta za održavanje adekvatnih vodećih metodoloških principa 
koji se bave pitanjem kako promatrati odnos između metodoloških perspektiva u komparativno 
angažiranom istraživanju u filozofiji. Svrha je ovog teksta istražiti kako, u globalnom kontekstu, 
različiti pristupi u filozofiji mogu biti angažirani tako da stupe u konstruktivan dijalog i da 





Wie ein konstruktives Engagement im komparativen 
Philosophieren möglich ist
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Artikel beabsichtige ich, auf der Grundlage einiger früherer einschlägiger Arbeiten 
zu diesem Thema, eine Reihe von Bedingungen für die Aufrechterhaltung adäquater metho-
dologischer Leitprinzipien weiter zu untersuchen, die sich mit der Frage befassen, wie das 
Verhältnis zwischen verschiedenen methodologischen Perspektiven in der komparativ enga-
gierten Forschung in der Philosophie einzuschätzen ist. Die Absicht dieses Aufsatzes ist es, zu 
erforschen, wie – im globalen Kontext – unterschiedliche Ansätze in der Philosophie engagiert 
werden können, um konstruktiv miteinander zu kommunizieren und einen gemeinsamen Beitrag 





Comment un engagement constructif est-il possible 
dans l’activité philosophique comparée
Résumé
J’ai l’intention dans cet article, sur la base de travaux antérieurs et pertinents pour la pro-
blématique, d’examiner une suite de conditions visant à maintenir les principes méthodologi-
ques directeurs et adéquats qui s’intéressent à la question comment les diverses perspectives 
méthodologiques interagissent au sein de leur engagement en philosophie comparée. Le but 
de ce texte est d’explorer, dans un contexte globale, la manière dont ces approches peuvent 
s’engager dans un dialogue constructif qui contribue au développement de la philosophie et 
de la société.
Mots-clés
engagement	constructif,	philosophie	comparée,	principes	méthodologiques	directeurs	 (leurs	condi-
tions	d’adéquation),	perspectives	méthodologiques
